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The effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit 





This study investigates the impact of foreign bank penetration on firm entry in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Acquisition of domestic banks by foreign investors has lowered rates of firm creation, de-
creased the average size of entrants, and increased firm exit in industries with greater informational 
opacity, while entry of greenfield foreign banks appears to have spurred firm creation and exit. We 
modify the view in earlier studies that informational opacity equates with firm size, defining opacity 
in terms of technological characteristics for a given industry. We find the economic significance of 
foreign bank entry is larger for opaque industries than industries with large shares of small firms. 
The study provides evidence of increased credit constraints for start-ups in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, which is consistent with the theoretical proposition that the presence of foreign banks exacer-
bates informational asymmetries. 
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The effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit 






Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ulkomaisten pankkien markkinoilletulon vaikutuksia yritysten syntyyn 
Keski- ja Itä-Euroopassa. Vaikutukset ovat erilaisia sen mukaan, ovatko ulkomaiset pankit tulleet 
markkinoille ostamalla toimivan kotimaisen pankin vai perustamalla täysin uuden rahoituslaitoksen. 
Yritysostojen kautta markkinoille tulleet ulkomaiset pankit hidastavat uusien yritysten syntyä, su-
pistavat syntyvien yritysten kokoa sekä nopeuttavat yritysten poistumista toimialoilla, joilla infor-
maatio on hyvin epäsymmetristä. Sen sijaan uusien, ulkomaalaisomisteisten pankkien tulo markki-
noille on lisännyt sekä yritysten syntyä että yrityskuolemia. Aiemmasta kirjallisuudesta poiketen 
toimialoittaisia informaatioepävarmuuksia kuvataan tässä tutkimuksessa yrityksen koon sijasta toi-
mialan teknisen rakenteen avulla. Verrattuna pienyritysvaltaisiin toimialoihin ulkomaisten pankkien 
markkinoilletulon vaikutukset ovat merkittävämpiä toimialoilla, joilla informaatioepävarmuudet 
ovat suuria. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan myös aloittavien yritysten luotonsaannin vaikeutuneen Kes-
ki- ja Itä-Euroopassa. Tulos on yhdenmukainen teoreettisen mallin kanssa; sen mukaan ulkomaisten 
pankkien läsnäolo lisää epäsymmetrisestä informaatiosta aiheutuvia vaikeuksia luottomarkkinoilla. 
 
 
Asiasanat: yrittäjyys, ulkomaisten pankkien tulo markkinoille, epäsymmetrinen informaatio, luotto-
rajoitteet 
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1  Introduction 
 
Economists generally agree that foreign bank entry has increased the supply of credit in developing 
and transition countries. This gain is often attributed to three advantages of foreign banks: greater 
efficiency in allocating funds from depositors to creditors, better access to international credit mar-
kets, and lower sensitivity to idiosyncratic shocks (Berger et al., 2000; Bonin et al., 2005; De Haas 
and Lelyveld, 2006; Claeys and Hainz, 2007). Despite a large body of literature on the role of for-
eign banks in emerging economies, the issue of how much borrowers actually benefit from this im-
proved access to credit remains murky. A number of studies claim that foreign banks avoid provid-
ing credit to small enterprises, preferring to focus on lending to large firms (Degryse et al., 2009). 
The reason for such lending policy may be due to the fact that foreign banks are good at digesting 
and acting on “hard” financial information but are at a disadvantage in collecting and communicat-
ing “soft” relationship-based information. From the public policy perspective, it would make no dif-
ference that foreign banks avoided lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as long 
as domestic banks were willing to pick up the slack and continue to serve smaller clients. The pol-
icy challenge emerges when foreign banks enter emerging markets through acquisition of domestic 
banks and the loss of domestic banks results in less credit access for SMEs. 
A shift in lending patterns in favor of large established firms poses a particularly dire threat 
for start-ups in transition economies. By definition, new firms with no track record are information-
ally opaque; they face severe credit constraints even in advanced financial markets.1 Yet, in transi-
tion countries, new firms are a major source of new jobs and contribute to lower inequality (Berko-
witz and Jackson, 2006). Moreover, the process of creative destruction appears to give a bigger 
boost to productivity growth in transition economies than in either industrialized or developing 
countries (Bartelsman et al., 2004).  
Our study analyzes the impact of foreign bank presence in Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) on the rate of firm entry and exit, size of entrants, and their survival probability 
in the initial years. The CEECs are well suited for this study as bank credit has formed the primary 
source of finance for enterprises. In contrast, CEEC capital markets, due to their thinness, have not 
provided a comparable access to finance. Moreover, the banking sector in CEECs has the highest 
                                                 
1 Banking credit is the main source of non-equity financing for “infant” enterprises less than two years old (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Firms that borrow from banks tend to concentrate their borrowing with a single institution, forming a 
long-term relationship that enables banks to collect private information on creditworthiness of these firms (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994).  
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level of foreign bank penetration in the world. This is of particular value for our discussion as the 
preferred mode of foreign entry has been acquisition of existing domestic banks, and led in some 
cases to a virtual extinction of domestic private banks (e.g. Estonia, the Czech Republic, and the 
Slovak Republic). Firm turnover (entry plus exit) is also relatively high in transition economies, 
reaching as much as 20.5 % of total number of firms (compared to a range of 3−10 % for developed 
economies). Notwithstanding the high rate of firm creation, the number of firms per capita remains 
below the western European level – a gap that shows no sign of closing. 
Numerous empirical studies provide strong evidence that foreign-owned banks treat small 
firms as informationally opaque and show greater reluctance than domestic banks in lending to 
them (Berger et al., 2001; Clarke et al., 2006; Mian, 2006; Berger et al., 2008). The arrival of for-
eign banks may cause domestic banks to shift their loan allocation to smaller borrowers (Degryse et 
al., 2009), leading to a mixed picture of the overall impact of foreign bank entry on credit access. 
Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) and Gormley (2010) find that foreign bank entry has negatively 
affected banking sector outreach and access to credit in Mexico and India, respectively. Giannetti 
and Ongena (2007), analyzing firm-level data for CEECs, conclude that established firms of all 
sizes benefited from foreign bank entry, but the lion’s share of the benefit went to big firms. None 
of these studies, however, considers the impact of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit, or 
the possible effect on entrant size. Moreover, they treat informational opacity as a function of firm 
size, disregarding other aspects of information asymmetry. 
In addition to contributing to the literature on impacts of foreign bank presence on the sup-
ply of credit to SMEs, we address the issue of credit constraints as a barrier to firm entry, noting 
three arenas of discussion. One group of papers establishes that the degree of development of finan-
cial institutions directly bears on firm entry and post-entry growth (Guiso and Sapienza, 2004; 
Klapper et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2007). A second group of theoretical and empirical studies sug-
gest that credit constraints diminish the size of start-ups so that they are unable to enter at optimal 
size (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Colombo and Grilli, 2005). The third 
group looks at specific aspects of financial development such as bank competition (Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) or US deregulation of bank branching 
restrictions  (Black  and  Strahan,  2002;  Kerr  and  Nanda,  2009;  Kerr  and  Nanda,  2010).  To  our 
knowledge, this study is unique in that it provides a combined assessment of the impacts of foreign 
bank presence on the firm entry and exit (extensive margin) and size of startups (intensive margin 
of entry).  
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We find consistent evidence that foreign bank penetration in CEECs has led to lower rates 
of firm entry and a higher rates of firm exit in opaque industries relative to transparent industries. 
Moreover, we find that the mode of foreign bank entry is crucial; the negative impact is driven by 
the disappearance of domestic banks due to their acquisition by foreign investors. In contrast, the 
entry of greenfield foreign banks appears to spur firm creation in more opaque industries, which is 
consistent with market segmentation theories. Finally, we show that the negative effect of foreign 
bank acquisitions is not experienced by sole entrepreneurs, suggesting that the average size of new 
entrants drops in line with the hypothesis of credit constraints. We test the robustness of our results 
by considering other factors that influence entry and exit of firms, such as firm entry regulation and 
credit supply. Our results have clear policy implications. Where acquisition of domestic banks by 
foreign investors discourages  entry of firms and diminishes the size of new  entrants,  available 
measures to lessen credit constraints for newly established firms need to be considered.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present theoretical considerations. Section 
3 describes our chosen empirical strategy and data. Sections 4 and 5 document our empirical find-
ings and report robustness tests. Section 6 concludes with policy suggestions. 
 
 
2  Theoretical considerations 
 
Information-based theories contend that foreign banks have a comparative advantage in lending 
based on “hard” information such as long credit histories and detailed financial statements, while 
domestic banks are better placed to lend to firms based on “soft” information such as knowledge 
about an entrepreneur based on personal relationships.2 Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) present a 
model where domestic banks, possessing an information advantage, compete for borrowers with 
foreign banks that have a cost advantage in extending a loan. This leads to the segmentation of lend-
ing markets; foreign banks take market share from local banks where soft informational disadvan-
tages are lowest. Under this model, small borrowers benefit as well, because domestic banks shift 
                                                 
2 Soft information tends to be more difficult to transfer than hard information. Hard information is credible, publicly 
verifiable data, such as a firm’s balance sheets, credit history, collateral, and guarantees. Soft information, in contrast, 
cannot be verified by a third person and is gained as a result of the relationship between a bank and a borrower. For 
example, a bank manager could gain, through repeated interviews with an owner of a new firm, a view that the firm’s 
owner is a smart, honest, and hard-working entrepreneur with a high probability of success. This soft information, how-
ever, cannot be transferred to other potential lenders (Petersen, 2004). Olena Havrylchyk  The effect of foreign bank presence  
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their credit allocation toward sectors where their competitors face greater adverse selection prob-
lems. 
Although not explicitly stated, the implications of the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) 
model vary depending on the mode of foreign banks entry. If banks enter via greenfield institutions, 
the model predicts segmentation of the market, but SMEs benefit because domestic banks step up 
their supply of loans to them. However, where foreign banks enter via acquisition of domestic insti-
tutions (as is mostly the case of transition economies), the number of domestic banks obviously 
falls. In this case, SMEs face increased credit constraints. 
The model proposed by Detragiache et al. (2008) starts with similar assumptions that do-
mestic banks have a cost advantage in gathering and processing soft information and foreign banks 
have the advantage in dealing with hard information. Under this set-up, however, outcomes depend 
on the costs of monitoring soft information and costs of adverse selection. When the cost of moni-
toring soft information is low, entry by foreign banks pushes the economy toward a separating equi-
librium (the foreign banks finance transparent borrowers and domestic banks finance opaque bor-
rowers).  However,  when  the  costs  of  monitoring  and  adverse  selection  are  high,  the  economy 
moves to the credit-constrained equilibrium, where borrowers seeking loans based on soft informa-
tion are excluded from the market – a behavior sometimes referred to a “cream-skimming.” Like the 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) model, this model implies that a separating equilibrium will only 
work if foreign banks enter via greenfield institutions. The credit-constrained equilibrium is more 
likely when foreign banks enter via acquisition of domestic institutions as foreign ownership in-
creases the cost of monitoring soft information. 
While none of these models considers the impact on firm entry and exit, the implications 
are self-evident: the choice of the mode of foreign bank entry is determinative. Acquisition of do-
mestic banks by foreign investors is likely to be detrimental to the entry of new firms due to re-
duced supply of loans to opaque clients, while the entry of foreign banks via greenfield investment 
may lead to market segmentation or credit-constrained equilibria.  
As to firm exit, consider an opaque firm that has a relationship with a domestic bank and 
this bank is acquired by a foreign investor. Here, the new bank owner has available hard and soft 
information proving the client’s creditworthiness. Assume that this foreign bank is at a disadvantage 
in communicating “soft” information within the organization. As a result, the bank does not renew 
loans to clients based on soft information. This idea is derived from Stein (2002), who argues that 
hierarchical organizations are more likely to rely on hard information than organizations with flatter 
structures. Flatter organizations have better control and information on their managers, and thus can  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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afford to give them more discretion and allow them to rely on soft information. This model, ex-
tended to large banks by Berger et al. (2005), is also applicable to foreign banks, which are often 
part of multinational banking groups and where communication of soft information is obstructed 
not just by hierarchy but also cultural and linguistic barriers. Similarly, discretion given to loan of-
ficers may promote politically connected lending, a common problem in developing countries (e.g. 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005). This leads to a hypothesis that the acquisition of domestic banks by for-
eign investors has a more positive effect on firm exit in opaque sectors than in transparent sectors. 
 
 
3  Estimation strategy and data 
 
Where foreign banks face greater informational asymmetries than domestic banks, information-
based theoretical models imply that their presence should have a differential effect on firm entry 
and exit depending on firm opacity. To capture the impact of foreign bank presence on firm demo-
graphics based on the degree of opaqueness of the industry in which the firm operates, we use a dif-
ference-in-differences approach inspired by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
This methodology has a number of well-recognized advantages in investigation of finan-
cial development impacts on economic growth, or more precisely, the effect of banking sector de-
velopment on the firm creation (Aghion et al., 2007; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; 
Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). The identification strategy minimizes the risk that our results are 
driven  by  reverse  causality  (foreign  banks  enter  markets  with  high  firm  entry  rates),  i.e.  it  is 
unlikely that banks would be attracted to a particular market just because a specific industry experi-
enced a relatively higher rate of firm creation. Moreover, the use of interactions reduces omitted 
variable problems, which drives both firm demographics and entry of foreign banks. 
The key variable in our empirical set-up is a measure of opacity. Earlier studies proxy firm 
opacity with firm size, but this measure cannot be used in the case of new entrants, because, by 
definition, neither small nor large start-ups have a credit history or financial statements with long 
history. Size becomes correlated with transparency only when these firms grow and auditing and 
disclosure requirements tend to be tighter. Hence, following Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia 
(2004), we construct our opacity measure as a ratio of total assets to fixed assets at the industry 
level                         ). The underlying notion here is that a bank can more easily evalu-
ate the quality of a business plan when it is based on a simple technology with a large predictable Olena Havrylchyk  The effect of foreign bank presence  
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component and where the unobservable quality of human capital or effort is less important in de-
termining the outcome. Moral hazard can also be reduced where technologies constitute a substan-
tial share of fixed assets available as collateral.3 The above ratio is calculated at the industry level, 
based on the individual firm data contained in the AMADEUS database for the period between 
2000 and 2005.4 To minimize measurement errors, we first drop companies falling outside the 5th 
and 95th percentiles of the distribution of our ratios.  
To test the robustness of our results, we propose an alternative measure of opaqueness: 
skills or knowledge intensity of industries (                           ).5 The idea here is simi-
lar to the previous argument; it is more difficult for a bank to evaluate firms that operate in indus-
tries with a relatively higher knowledge component to their value-added process. Brewer et al. 
(1996) argue that knowledge assets and R&D-intensive physical assets are highly firm- and indus-
try- specific, thus lowering liquidity value and recovery rates for a bank. Moreover, availability of 
knowledge assets increases moral hazard by permitting greater managerial discretion in shifting to 
riskier projects. These theoretical considerations are supported by empirical evidence of higher fi-
nancial constraints for firms in knowledge-intensive industries (Gellatly et al., 2004). Accordingly, 
we compute an alternative measure of opaqueness as a ratio of skilled labor to total labor at the in-
dustry level, where skilled employee is defined as an employee that has completed at least a few 
years of college. The data come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.6 
We define opacity in terms of the technological content of specific industries. As we ar-
gued earlier, information on size of new entrants in itself cannot be relied on to compute opacity. 
Nevertheless, we can compute a share of small firms in a total number of firms in a given industy 
                                                 
3 In this vein, Sengupta (2007) presents a model where foreign banks are more likely to rely on collateral as a screening 
device to contest the informational advantage of incumbent banks. This idea is confirmed by Haselman (2010) who 
show that better collateral legislation plays a larger positive role in loan supply by foreign banks relatively to their do-
mestic peers. Research also shows that ratings agencies find it easier to rate firms with higher shares of fixed assets.  
4 Following Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), we calculate opaqueness indicators relying on local data for 
CEECs. This approach departs from that of Rajan and Zingales (1998), who rely on the measure of financial depen-
dence based on the US data. One can argue that the measure of financial dependence is correlated with financial con-
straints. As such, a neutral measure of financial dependence requires data from a market (e.g. the US) with no credit 
constraints. In our case, share of fixed assets is not endogenous, so we need to measure opaqueness in the countries of 
interest. We test robustness of our results on the UK data, and find that opaqueness of industries is highly correlated 
between countries and our estimations yield similar results. We additionally find that our results hold even if we rely on 
financial dependence rather than opacity.  
5 This measure has been inspired by Carlin and Mayer (2003), who look at the relationship between financial develop-
ment and growth of industries with high level of skilled labor. Skill dependence is used as a proxy for dependence of 
industries on investment by other stakeholders.   
6 Similar to opacity measure in terms of fixed assets, we would like to compute skill dependence relying on the CEEC 
data, but to our knowledge, such data is not collected. However, Carlin and Mayer (2003) show that skill dependence of 
industries is highly correlated across countries (correlation coefficient of 0.83), which justifies our use of the US data.  
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(            )7 to test whether foreign bank entry has had a disproportional effect on industries 
with higher shares of small enterprises due to the level of technology adoption and innovation re-
quired by the industry. Such use of “technological size” was introduced by Beck et al. (2008) in 
their study of the impact of financial deepening on small firms. Contrary to common assumption, 
industries that have high share of small firms are not necessarily opaque. For instance, firms that are 
engaged in repair of goods are often small but quite transparent; the skills of employees are often 
not acquired formally and the firm’s fixed assets can readily be used as collateral. At the same time, 
production of computers is done by large firms, but they are rather opaque, because their workforce 
is highly educated and the share of non-tangible assets is very high.   
 
The estimated model can be formally stated as:  
                                                                                            
                                            
         
 includes the following firm demographic statistics: entry, exit, net entry, and 
survival rates. Entry/exit rates refer to a number of firms that entered/exited industry   in country   
and in year   divided by total firms in this industry, country, and year. Net entry rate is computed as 
a difference between entry and exit. Survival rate is computed as the number of firms created in 
year       that survived until time   as a percentage share of firms in year      .8 Data on firm 
demographics are taken from the business demography statistics provided by Eurostat. Our data al-
low us to calculate the demographic indicators of firms with respect to size. Thus, we compute en-
try, exit, net entry, and survival rates for the firms with 1) no employees, 2) between one and four 
employees; 3) between five and nine employees and 4) more than nine employees. All variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1. 
The initial share (                ) of each industry   in the local market   at the beginning 
of the analyzed period accounts for the fact that firm demographics depend on the stage of industry 
development (new, mature, declining, etc.) and is computed with AMADEUS data. The interaction 
term is the product of opacity in industry   and a measure for the degree of foreign bank presence in 
                                                 
7 A firm is considered small if its sales are below the 10
th percentile of total sales of firms. A robustness check using 
firms’ assets found similar results. 
8 For robustness purposes, we also compute survival rates at three, four and five years after firm creation. The findings 
remain generally unchanged, so we prefer to report the results of survival after two years due to the higher number of 
observations.  Olena Havrylchyk  The effect of foreign bank presence  
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country   and in year      . Foreign bank presence is measured as a share of foreign banks in the 
total bank capital in country   and in year   (          ). The data are taken from BankScope and 
augmented by information provided by central banks, as well as our own web searches of bank 
websites and newspapers. In addition, we include industry dummies, as well as country*year dum-
mies to control for industry and time varying country effects. We also add size-specific effects 
when we incorporate firm size dimension into the model.  
We perform our analysis based on a dataset that includes 52 industries in nine CEECs 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia) for the period 2000−2005.9 It is immediately apparent that CEECs experience high 
levels of new firm births and old firm exits. Table 2 shows that in a given year an average of 12 % 
of all firms are new entrants and 8 % are likely to exit. This figure is somewhat higher than firm 
turnover in developed countries, where the entry rate is below 6 % (Aghion et al., 2007). The aver-
age density of firms, measured by a number of enterprises per 10,000 in population is still lower in 
the CEECs than in western Europe, but there is great variation inside the region. The Czech Repub-
lic has the highest enterprise density in Europe, while Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania 
have the lowest (Figure 1). At the same time, if we compute the density of firm entry (number of 
new enterprises per 10,000 in population), the difference between developed and emerging Europe 
is not statistically significant (Figure 2), suggesting that the current rate of new firm creation in 
CEECs remains insufficient to  catch up with western Europe.  
Given that our empirical methodology investigates the variation of entry rates between in-
dustries, we present average entry rates with respect to several industries (Figure 3). As expected, 
new industries such as computers and related activities experience the fastest entry rates, whereas 
entry is lowest in manufacturing. Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of our opacity measures: 1) total 
assets divided by fixed assets, and 2) share of skilled employees to total employees. Our results 
demonstrate that industries in which the quality of human capital or effort plays the decisive role 
(e.g. software, hardware, data processing, architecture, research and development, and advertising) 
are among the most informationally opaque sectors. Even so, the correlation between these two 
measures is only 38 %, and some industries appear to be opaque according to the first measure (e.g. 
cleaning,  and  construction),  but  completely  transparent  under  the  second  measure.  A  relatively 
small correlation between our measures of opacity implies that these indicators describe different 
                                                 
9 Eurostat has no data on firm demographics for Poland, so it was excluded here.  
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aspects of informational asymmetries.10 Finally, we present a scatter plot of the average firm entry 
and the share of domestic banks acquired by foreign investors (Figure 5). The strong negative corre-




4  Empirical findings 
 
We report the findings of the baseline model in Table 3. Our variable of interest is the interaction 
between foreign bank share and opacity, which is negative in all models with the firm entry rate as 
dependant variable. Notwithstanding the measure of opacity (in terms of fixed assets or skill de-
pendence), foreign bank presence is associated with lower firm creation in informationally opaque 
industries than in transparent industries. At the same time, we find no significant effect of foreign 
bank penetration on firm entry in industries with greater dependence on small firms. These results 
are robust when we control for the exit rate; i.e. account for the “administrative turnover” of firms 
that change their legal status (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). The coefficient for exit 
variable is significant and positive, indicating that a higher entry rate correlates with higher exit 
rates. Our main results are confirmed by the model with net-entry as a dependant variable.11  
We also find that foreign bank presence leads to higher exit rates for firms in opaque in-
dustries than in transparent ones. These results are likely to be associated with incumbent firms as 
no effect on the survival of newly established firms is observed (see column 6 in Table 3). We in-
terpret these finding by the greater reluctance of foreign banks to engage in relationship lending; 
lending officers in such banks have greater difficulties in communicating soft information to their 
bank headquarters abroad. Alternatively, where politically connected lending is more likely to hap-
pen in opaque industries (because lending officers have greater personal discretion), our results 
would suggest that foreign banks are less susceptible to political pressure and less likely to lend to 
connected parties (Detragiache et al., 2006; Giannetti and Ongena, 2007). 
                                                 
10 The share of small firms is correlated with skill dependence (correlation coefficient of 0.30), but not with the ratio of 
total assets to fixed assets. 
11 We could pose a question differently and analyze whether the share of domestic banks has a disproportionally larger 
positive effect for the entry opaque firms. The conclusion would be the same, but it is important to note that the effect is 
driven by domestic private banks, whereas the effect of state-owned banks on entry is almost insignificant.  Olena Havrylchyk  The effect of foreign bank presence  
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Our findings do not concur with the work of Giannetti and Ongena (2007), who claim that 
foreign bank entry spurs both entry and exit in CEECs. This difference is likely due to data issues; 
their study relies on AMADEUS firm-level data to calculate entry and exit of firms, while we use 
the actual data on firm demographics. It also explains why we have similar results for exit of in-
cumbent firms (present both in AMADEUS and in our database), while our results differ with re-
spect to new entrants (not present in AMADEUS but covered by our database). 
In section 2, we argued that the effect of foreign bank entry differs depending on the mode 
of entry. In Table 4, we present results separately for foreign investors that entered via acquisition 
of domestic banks and those that established greenfield banks. In line with theoretical predictions, 
the negative effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry in opaque industries is observed only 
when foreign banks prefer to enter via acquisition of domestic banks. There is no impact when for-
eign banks establish greenfield institutions. Therefore, it is not the entry of foreign banks, but the 
disappearance of domestic banks, that exacerbates informational asymmetries and leads to credit 
constraints for start-ups. The impact of both modes of bank entry on firm exit is positive, but no 
longer consistently significant.  
In the following specifications, we relax the assumption of common coefficient of the in-
teraction term and allow it to vary according to the firm size. The results, presented in Table 5, con-
firm our previous finding that the mode of foreign bank entry is important; only the acquisition of 
domestic banks leads to lower rates of firm creation in opaque industries. The impact is similar 
across all size categories, with the exception of individual entrepreneurs,12 which means a decrease 
in the average size of start-ups in more opaque industries in the wake of foreign bank entry. Follow-
ing hypothesis of Evan and Jovanovic (1989), we interpret this result as evidence of increasing 
credit constraints that prevent new firms from entering at their optimal size. We also find that the 
entry of foreign greenfield banks increases firm creation. It should be stressed that this effect is not 
due to higher supply of loans to start-ups by greenfield banks, but rather to the competitive pressure 
that they exert on domestic banks. In a similar vein, Degryse et al. (2009) provide empirical evi-
dence that greenfield banks attract the most transparent borrowers, and that their entry has a positive 
effect on loan supply by domestic banks to more opaque and riskier borrowers. This result is consis-
tent with the theory of loan market segmentation of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004).  
                                                 
12 The lack of impact on individual entrepreneurs that have no employees could be due to new lending approaches, e.g. 
credit score lending, that are well suited to funding small firms (Mester, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). This is espe-
cially true when credit scores are based on the owner’s personal consumer data obtained from consumer credit bureaus 
and combined with data on the SME collected by financial institutions.   
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As to firm exit, we find that foreign bank presence has a positive effect on the exit of 
smaller firms in opaque industries regardless of mode of bank entry (Table 5). Note that we mostly 
do not observe disproportionately negative effects on survival of these firms. The implication here 
is that our finding refers to the exit of incumbent firms, not start-ups. As mentioned earlier, size can 
be used as a measure of opacity for incumbent firms. Therefore, a higher exit rate for smaller firms 
in opaque industries in countries with deeper foreign bank penetration likely signals tighter credit 
constraints for these firms.  
As we rely on a difference-in-differences estimation, it is worth pointing out what the coef-
ficients mean in terms of economic significance. Take, for example, the electricity industry, which 
is at the 25th percentile of opacity, and compare it to database activities, which are at 75th percen-
tile for opacity defined in terms of fixed assets. The coefficient suggests that the difference in entry 
rates between electricity and database industries in the Czech Republic (which was at the 75th per-
centile in 2002 in terms of foreign bank presence in 2002) is 0.6 percentage points higher than the 
difference in entry rates between these same industries in Latvia (which is at the 25th percentile in 
terms of foreign bank presence). In other words, moving from the Czech Republic to Latvia would 
benefit an opaque industry like database activities more than a firm in a more transparent industry. 
This observed change amounts to 4 % of the mean difference in entry rates between these industries 
across all countries, which reaches 15 %. While this effect may seem negligible, we should recall 
that it is driven by the fact that there is no significant effect on the creation of individual entrepre-
neurs. If we look at the creation of firms with more than 9 employees, the observed change amounts 
to 48 % of the mean difference. The economic significance is quite similar when industry opacity is 
measured in terms of skill dependence. 
 
 
5  Additional robustness tests  
 
Our measure of opacity as a ratio of total assets to fixed assets can cause an identification problem 
as it may be that industries characterized by a high share of fixed assets are also those with high 
fixed start-up costs (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). These firms might benefit as for-
eign banks prefer to extend loans to larger firms or they might suffer if these banks, for diversifica-
tion purposes, decide to issue many smaller loans rather than to fund a small number of large bor-Olena Havrylchyk  The effect of foreign bank presence  
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rowers. Therefore, we introduce a control variable for start-up costs that equals to the average vol-
ume of fixed assets of young firms (less than five years) in the industry (            ). In addition, 
we  construct  an  opaqueness  indicator  employing  firms  younger  than  five  years 
                                         ). The results are presented in Table 6. The coeffi-
cient of the interaction with entry costs almost never achieves significance level and its inclusion 
does not modify our baseline results. Therefore, we can rule out the explanation that foreign bank 
entry has led to changes in entry rates of firms in industries depending on the size of entry costs. 
The entry of foreign banks in CEECs happened after authorities liberalized entry rules for 
foreign institutions. In theory, all types of entry regulation might have been liberalized at the same 
time, and, hence it is necessary to account for the entry regulation of firms (Djankov et al., 2002). 
To control for this, we include an additional interaction variable between an indicator that measures 
the ease of starting a new business (in terms of time and costs) and a natural rate of firm entry in 
absence of all entry barriers. Results, reported in Panel A of Table 7, are robust to the inclusion of 
this variable. 
Finally, the entry of foreign banks has been accompanied by rapid growth of the financial 
sector through improved access to international capital markets or via loans from parent banks. To 
control for this, we include an interaction term between financial depth and opacity (Panel B, Table 
7), but the inclusion of this variable does not change our baseline results. While our findings con-
firm previous results that associate deeper financial markets with smaller credit constraints for start-
ups (Guiso and Sapienza, 2004; Klapper et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2007), the economic signifi-
cance of this effect is tiny in this case. From the perspective of entrepreneurs, the increased supply 
of credit in the wake of foreign bank entry matters less than the increased informational asymme-
tries that made foreign banks less suitable to lend to them. 
  
  
6  Conclusions 
 
Although economists generally accept that foreign banks have contributed to the increased loan 
supply in CEECs, there has been little discussion on how evenly the benefits of increased access to 
credit have been spread among borrowers. A number of theoretical papers argue that foreign banks 
have a comparative advantage in lending to informationally transparent firms, while domestic banks 
are better suited to engage in “relationship lending” with opaque borrowers.  Given that start-ups  
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are the most opaque clients, we were interested here in whether high opacity firms gained or lost 
from the presence of foreign banks.  
Our  analysis  provides  several  notable  findings.  First,  the  presence  of  foreign  banks  is 
robustly associated with a lower entry rate of firms and smaller size of entrants in industries charac-
terized by high informational asymmetries compared to more transparent industries.  Second, we 
find that foreign bank entry has a positive effect on exit rate in opaque industries. These impacts are 
economically significant and consistent with theories that emphasize the role of domestic banks in 
servicing opaque firms such as start-ups. 
It should be stressed that the effect of foreign bank penetration depends on their mode of 
entry. The observed negative effects are due to virtual extinctions of domestic banks where foreign 
investors entered the local banking market through acquisition. In contrast, the entry of foreign 
banks via greenfield investment is associated with higher rate of firm creation in more opaque in-
dustries, which we interpret as a sign of market segmentation where greenfield foreign banks attract 
transparent borrowers and, thus, increase competitive pressure on domestic banks to increase their 
supply of loans to SMEs.  
Our results should be viewed in the context of the literature on the impact of foreign bank 
entry on loan supply. Despite positive effects of foreign banks entry on the average loan supply and 
its stability (De Haas and Lelyveld, 2006), all borrowers have certainly not benefited equally. Large 
incumbent firms (and, to a lesser degree, medium and relatively small firms) have seen their access 
to credit improve (Giannetti and Ongena, 2007). At the same time, our study shows that foreign 
bank entry could have tightened credit constraints for SMEs, forcing their exit and reducing the en-
try of new firms. 
Our results hold important policy implications as they show that foreign bank entry can 
impair creation of new firms in industries with higher informational asymmetries. We argue that 
firm opacity is not necessarily correlated with its size, preferring instead the measures that capture 
availability of collateral and skill dependence. Moreover, we document that economic significance 
of foreign bank entry is larger for opaque industries than for industries with large share of small 
firms. By definition, opaque industries possess high levels of knowledge and skill intensity (e.g. re-
liance on advanced information technologies), and therefore are crucial in laying the groundwork 
for future economic growth. Policymakers should consider this negative aspect of foreign bank en-
try alongside the more obvious positive consequences such as the increased and more stable supply 
of lending to large firms. When foreign banks have a massive presence in the country and domestic Olena Havrylchyk  The effect of foreign bank presence  
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banks have been displaced, alternative ways of supporting entrepreneurship need to be explored 
such as the creation of venture capital funds or state sovereign wealth funds in order to assist start-
ups and SMEs in opaque industries.  
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Figure 1  Firm density 
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Figure 4 Scatter plot of two measures of opacity 
 
Sources: Amadeus, US Bureau of Labor statistics, and authors’ calculations 
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Figure 5  Scatter plot of firm entry vs. share of foreign acquired banks for the period 2000-2005 
 
Sources: Eurostat, BancScope, and authors’ calculations 
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Table 1  Description of variables 
Variable  Definition  Data source 
     
Demographic variables 
Entryijt   Number of firms that entered industry   in country   and in 
year   divided by total firms in this industry, country, and 
year.  
Business Demogra-
phy Statistic (BDS) of 
Eurostat 
Exitijt  Number of firms that exited industry   in country   and in 
year   divided by total firms in this industry, country, and 
year. 
BDS of Eurostat 
Net entryijt  Difference between entry and exit.   BDS of Eurostat 
Survivalijt  Number of firms that have been created in year       and have 
survived till time   as a percentage share of firms in year    
 . 
BDS of Eurostat 
Firm density   Number of enterprises per 10,000 of population.  BDS of Eurostat 
Firm entry density   Number of new enterprises per 10,000 of population.  BDS of Eurostat 
     
Industry level variables 
Opacity( fixed assets)i  An average ratio of total assets to fixed assets for an industry 
i. 
Amadeus 
Opacity( fixed assets 
of young firms)i 
An average ratio of total assets to fixed assets for an industry 




Ratio of skilled labor to total labor, where skilled employee is 
defined as one that has completed at least a few years of col-
lege.  
US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
Opacity (small firms)i  Share of small firms in a total number of firms. A firm is con-
sidered small if its sales fall below the 10
th percentile of total 
sales of firms. 
Amadeus 
Entry costsi  Average volume of fixed assets of young firms (under five 
years) in the industry. 
Amadeus 
Initial sharei  The initial share of each industry   in the local market   at the 
beginning of the analyzed period 
Amadeus 
Naturali  Entry rate in industry i in the UK.  BDS of Eurostat 
     
Country level variables 
Foreignjt  Foreign bank presence is measured as a share of foreign banks 
in the total bank capital in country   and in year   
BankScope and own 
research 
Greenfieldit  Greenfield mode of foreign bank entry is measured as a share 
of foreign banks that entered via greenfield investment in the 
total bank capital in country   and in year   
Own research 
Acquiredit  Acquired mode of foreign bank entry is measured as a share of 
foreign banks that entered via acquisition of incumbent do-
mestic banks in the total bank capital in country   and in year 
  
Own research 
Creditjt  A ratio of total credit to GDP in country   and in year    IFS 
Start-up costsjt  An indicator that evaluates the freedom (time and costs) of 
starting a new business; indicator ranges from 0 (least free) to 
10 (most free). 
Fraser Institute 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the period 2000-2005 
 
Obs.  Mean  Std. dev. 
Entry rate (in percent) 
 
Total  2503  12.00  7.57 
No employees  2400  20.28  17.14 
1 – 4 employees  2455  12.07  9.77 
5 – 9 employees  2393  6.09  8.36 
More than 9 employees  2391  3.08  4.46 
        Exit rate (in percent) 
 
Total  2236  8.49  4.38 
No employees  2146  17.20  14.12 
1 – 4 employees  2195  8.05  7.32 
5 – 9 employees  2142  3.20  5.06 
More than 9 employees  2155  1.78  2.60 
 
Net entry rate (in percent) 
       
Total  2229  3.85  7.73 
No employees  2129  4.05  20.70 
1 – 4 employees  2176  4.28  11.55 
5 – 9 employees  2111  3.07  9.87 
More than 9 employees  2109  1.33  4.53 
        Survival rate (in percent) 
 
Total  1508  75.75  14.15 
No employees  1372  67.76  20.14 
1 – 4 employees  1457  82.49  14.80 
5 – 9 employees  1190  88.33  16.35 
More than 9 employees  1163  87.24  19.06 
       
Entry/exit rates refer to a number of firms that entered/exited industry   in country   and in year   divided by total firms in this indus-
try, country and year. Net entry is computed as a difference between entry and exit. Survival is computed as a percentage share of 
firms created in year       that survive until time  . 
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Table 3  The impact of foreign bank presence on firm demographics depending on industry opacity 
 
Entry  Entry  Exit  Net entry  Survival 
            Panel A 
          Initial industry share  -0.013  -0.063**  0.084*  -0.134*  0.287* 
 
(0.704)  (0.045)  (0.056)  (0.096)  (0.066) 
Foreign*opacity (fixed assets)  -0.292**  -0.248**  0.504***  -0.661***  -0.709 
 
(0.013)  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.289) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  0.018  0.022  0.141*  -0.125  -0.898 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  11.58***  14.45***  6.121**  8.030***  58.55*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4399  4300  4063  3999  2368 
R-squared  0.539  0.571  0.601  0.146  0.364 
            Panel B 
          Initial industry share  -0.003  -0.055*  0.068  -0.114  0.329** 
 
(0.908)  (0.080)  (0.118)  (0.147)  (0.033) 
Foreign*opacity (skill dependence)  -0.043***  -0.042***  0.042***  -0.098***  0.064 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.431) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  0.138  0.147  0.075  0.114  -1.082** 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  12.15***  11.29***  6.657***  7.181***  45.72*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4318  4224  3996  3933  2320 
R-squared  0.537  0.568  0.599  0.150  0.364 
Robust p-values in parentheses; industry and time-varying country dummies are included; clustered by country/industry. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 The impact of foreign bank presence on firm demographics depending on industry opacity and share of small 
firms 
 
Entry  Entry  Exit  Net entry  Survival 
            Panel A 
          Initial industry share  -0.030  -0.0973***  0.0685  -0.135*  0.336* 
 
(0.560)  (0.000)  (0.347)  (0.096)  (0.066) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets)  -0.527***  -0.435***  0.322  -0.674***  -0.447 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.146)  (0.000)  (0.558) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets)  0.612  0.215  1.286*  -0.693  -0.480 
 
(0.252)  (0.596)  (0.050)  (0.337)  (0.760) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  -0.003  0.0347  0.0604  -0.131  -0.726* 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  5.891***  6.602***  -2.578  7.027***  56.19*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.340)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4399  4300  4063  3999  2368 
R-squared  0.083  0.451  0.085  0.130  0.270 
            Panel B 
          Initial industry share  -0.028  -0.089**  0.042  -0.117  0.349* 
 
(0.592)  (0.011)  (0.552)  (0.135)  (0.055) 
Acquired*opacity (skill dependence)  -0.049**  -0.056***  0.037  -0.105***  0.0361 
 
(0.019)  (0.000)  (0.108)  (0.000)  (0.690) 
Greenfield*opacity (skill dependence)  -0.0244  -0.056  0.074  -0.029  0.342** 
 
(0.630)  (0.166)  (0.259)  (0.684)  (0.042) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  0.107  0.185  -0.019  0.106  -0.893* 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  6.544***  4.197***  3.779*  7.907***  30.48** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.086)  (0.000)  (0.019) 
Observations  4318  4224  3996  3933  2320 
R-squared  0.082  0.448  0.085  0.134  0.274 
Robust p-values in parentheses; industry and time-varying country dummies are included; clustered by country/industry. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5  The impact of foreign bank presence on firm demographics by size depending on industry 
opacity 
 
Entry  Entry  Exit  Net entry  Survival 
Initial industry share  0.004  -0.0467  0.107**  -0.134*  0.265* 
 
(0.897)  (0.143)  (0.015)  (0.097)  (0.098) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets) 0  -0.204  -0.155  0.511***  -0.538*  -0.064 
 
(0.276)  (0.380)  (0.007)  (0.092)  (0.937) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets) 1-4  -2.992**  -2.685**  -1.406  0.149  -0.104 
 
(0.019)  (0.034)  (0.162)  (0.926)  (0.988) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets) 4-9  -0.642***  -0.552***  0.440***  -1.065***  -0.172 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.817) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets) >9  -0.307**  -0.211*  0.377***  -0.582**  -1.212 
 
(0.017)  (0.087)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.199) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets) 0  1.389***  1.128**  2.151***  -0.707  1.374 
 
(0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.374)  (0.428) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets) 1-4  9.622**  10.41***  8.550**  -5.588  11.44 
 
(0.011)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.301)  (0.476) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets) 4-9  0.613  0.499  1.481***  -0.676  -3.685** 
 
(0.125)  (0.200)  (0.000)  (0.374)  (0.034) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets) >9  1.656***  1.359***  2.366***  -0.581  -1.939 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  10.08***  12.91***  2.572  6.603***  51.68*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.320)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4399  4300  4063  3999  2368 
R-squared  0.544  0.575  0.603  0.147  0.368 
Robust p-values in parentheses; industry, size and time-varying country dummies are included; clustered by coun-
try/industry. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6  Robustness test: Fixed assets for young firms and entry costs 
 
Entry  Entry  Exit  Net entry  Survival 
Initial industry share  -0.031  -0.095***  0.071  -0.135*  0.344* 
 
(0.554)  (0.009)  (0.327)  (0.097)  (0.063) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets of young firms)  -0.492***  -0.390***  0.307  -0.553**  -0.343 
 
(0.008)  (0.002)  (0.147)  (0.016)  (0.643) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets of  young firms)  0.532  0.165  1.384**  -0.976  -0.202 
 
(0.305)  (0.671)  (0.031)  (0.155)  (0.893) 
Entry costs  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
(0.949)  (0.443)  (0.566)  (0.391)  (0.868) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  -0.025  -0.002  0.093  -0.209  -0.761* 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  5.993***  6.800***  -3.268  7.804***  55.81*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.237)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4399  4300  4063  3999  2368 
R-squared  0.083  0.451  0.085  0.130  0.270 
Robust p-values in parentheses; industry and time-varying country dummies are included; clustered by coun-
try/industry. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7  Robustness test: Controlling for start-up costs and financial development 
 
Entry  Entry  Exit  Net entry  Survival 
Panel A 
          Initial industry share  -0.030  -0.096***  0.069  -0.136*  0.326* 
 
(0.572)  (0.008)  (0.338)  (0.093)  (0.075) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets)  -0.503**  -0.416***  0.346  -0.707***  -0.530 
 
(0.011)  (0.003)  (0.120)  (0.004)  (0.488) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets)  0.640  0.235  1.339**  -0.766  -0.903 
 
(0.232)  (0.563)  (0.040)  (0.293)  (0.568) 
Start-up costs*Natural  -0.005  -0.004  -0.007  0.010  0.0441* 
 
(0.342)  (0.411)  (0.350)  (0.310)  (0.063) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  0.006  0.0425  0.071  -0.147  -0.808** 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  6.002***  6.655***  -2.312  6.754***  55.35*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.397)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4399  4300  4063  3999  2368 
R-squared  0.083  0.451  0.085  0.130  0.272 
            Panel B 
          Initial industry share  -0.041  -0.100***  0.0574  -0.123  0.283 
 
(0.442)  (0.006)  (0.426)  (0.128)  (0.127) 
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets)  -0.408**  -0.405***  0.420*  -0.782***  -0.543 
 
(0.047)  (0.004)  (0.066)  (0.002)  (0.481) 
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets)  0.333  0.142  1.267*  -0.670  -0.843 
 
(0.545)  (0.731)  (0.0543)  (0.355)  (0.595) 
Credit*opacity (fixed assets)  0.010***  0.002  0.011**  -0.011**  0.025* 
 
(0.005)  (0.328)  (0.0181)  (0.0145)  (0.0573) 
Foreign*Share of small firms  0.038  0.046  0.111  -0.187  -0.704* 
 




     
   
(0.000) 
      Constant  3.236  6.200***  -5.227*  8.822***  48.90*** 
 
(0.132)  (0.000)  (0.0817)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  4399  4300  4063  3999  2368 
R-squared  0.084  0.451  0.086  0.131  0.272 
Robust p-values in parentheses; industry and time-varying country dummies are included; clustered by country/industry. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
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